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Digital disinformation has become an increasingly prominent topic in both 
public and academic debates. In 2016, the World Economic Forum identified 
online warfare and disinformation as one of the top ten global risks.1 The use 
of  disinformation—which is distinct from misinformation in being not only 
false but false as part of a ‘purposeful effort to mislead, deceive, or confuse’2—
preoccupies western audiences.3 Particularly in the wake of the crisis in Ukraine 
that erupted in 2013–2014, the Kremlin has been accused of orchestrating disin-
formation campaigns against the Ukrainian government and western countries 
by using online trolls and state-controlled online outlets such as RT (formerly 
known as Russia Today), Sputnik and Life News.4 This has led to a wave of 
counter- disinformation measures in the West to combat what is seen as a threat 
* We wish to thank Sune Lehmann, Frederik Georg Hjorth, Anders Søgaard, Jason Reifler, Joshua A. Tucker, 
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Brian Keegan, Pål Røren, Sergey Sanovich and Anders Wivel for their helpful comments. We would also like 
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1 World Economic Forum, Global Risk Report (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2016).
2 Jim Fetzer, ‘Disinformation: the use of false information’, Minds and Machines 14: 2, 2004, pp. 231–40 at p. 231.
3 Hunt Allcott and Matthew Gentzkow, ‘Social media and fake news in the 2016 election’, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 31: 2, Spring 2017, pp. 211–36; David Lazer, Matthew Baum, Nir Grinberg, Lisa Friedland, Kenneth 
Joseph, Will Hobbs and Carolina Mattsson, Combating fake news: an agenda for research and action, report of a 
conference held 17–18 Feb. 2017 (Cambridge, MA, and Boston: Harvard University and Northeastern Univer-
sity, 2017), https://shorensteincenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Combating-Fake-News-Agenda-for-
Research-1.pdf; Chengcheng Shao, Giovanni Luca Ciampaglia, Onur Varol, Alessandro Flammini and Filippo 
Menczer, ‘The spread of low-credibility content by social bots’, Sept. 2017, https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.07592; 
Fabio Giglietto, Laura Iannelli, Luca Rossi and Augusto Valeriani, ‘Fakes, news and the election: a new taxon-
omy for the study of misleading information within the hybrid media system’, Convegno AssoComPol 2016, 
Dec. 2016, pp. 1–40, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2878774. (Unless otherwise noted 
at point of citation, all URLs cited in this article were accessible on 31 July 2018.)
4 Corneliu Bjola and James Pamment, ‘Digital containment: revisiting containment strategy in the digital age’, 
Global Affairs 2: 2, May 2016, pp. 131–42; Peter Pomerantsev, ‘The Kremlin’s information war’, Journal of 
Democracy 26: 4, Oct. 2015, pp. 40–50; Rod Thornton, ‘The changing nature of modern warfare: responding 
to Russian information warfare’, RUSI Journal 160: 4, Sept. 2015, pp. 40–48; Andrei Aliaksandrau, ‘Brave new 
war: the information war between Russia and Ukraine’, Index on Censorship 43: 4, Dec. 2014, pp. 54–60.
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to  democracy, international security and stability. Yet while we know a certain 
amount about top-down regime tactics and strategies, we know much less about 
who actually spreads digital disinformation and who counters it.
Within the field of political science as well as within propaganda and security 
studies, disinformation campaigns are often described as ‘information warfare’, 
sponsored more or less directly by governments.5 The term refers to the strategic 
use of information and disinformation to achieve political and military goals.6 
While this concept highlights the importance of ordinary citizens, it implies that 
information is used as a weapon and the minds of citizens are the ‘battlefield’.7
One significant example of information warfare in the western debate is the 
Russian mainstream media’s dissemination of the Kremlin’s disputed statements 
about Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. At first, the Kremlin claimed that 
the Russian armed forces were not conducting an operation to capture Ukrainian 
territory, framing the presence of armed men as an uprising led exclusively by local 
citizens in Crimea against the new government in Ukraine. The Russian govern-
ment later withdrew this statement, acknowledging its military involvement in 
Crimea in support of the local rebels.8 At the height of the crisis, false information 
about what was alleged to be a purely local conflict may have helped the Kremlin 
create confusion as to whether Ukraine was actually at war and, if so, with whom. 
At the same time, it also made political or military confrontations with Russia more 
difficult to legitimize.9 General Philip Breedlove, Supreme Allied Commander for 
NATO in Europe at that time, went as far as calling the Russian operation ‘the 
most amazing information warfare blitzkrieg we have ever seen in the history of 
information warfare’.10 
While many western scholars use the term ‘information warfare’ to describe 
the spread of pro-Kremlin information to western audiences, Russian public 
officials and academics argue that western countries are also waging information 
warfare against Russia.11 According to these Russian observers, the West seeks to 
 destabilize Russia’s current political regime, weaken the country’s position in the 
international arena and spread ‘Russophobia’.12
5 Thornton, ‘The changing nature’; Brett van Niekerk, ‘Information warfare in the 2013–2014 Ukraine crisis’, 
in Jean-Loup Richet, ed., Cybersecurity policies and strategies for cyberwarfare prevention (Hershey, PA: IGI Global, 
2015); Edward Spiers, ‘NATO and information warfare’, in David Welch, ed., Propaganda, power and persuasion: 
from World War I to WikiLeaks (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013); Philip M. Taylor, Munitions of the mind: a history of 
propaganda (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
6 Thornton, ‘The changing nature’, p. 43.
7 Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Victor Mauer, ‘The role of the state in securing the information age: challenges 
and prospects’, in Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Victor Mauer, eds, Power and security in the information age: inves-
tigating the role of the state in cyberspace (London: Routledge, 2008); see also Thornton, ‘The changing nature’.
8 ‘Putin acknowledges Russian military serviceman were in Crimea’, RT International, 17 April 2017, https://
www.rt.com/news/crimea-defense-russian-soldiers-108/.
9 Roy Allison, ‘Russian “deniable” intervention in Ukraine: how and why Russia broke the rules’, International 
Affairs 90: 6, Nov. 2014, pp. 1255–97.
10 Quoted in Peter Pomerantsev, ‘Russia and the menace of unreality’, The Atlantic, 9 Sept. 2014, https://www.
theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/09/russia-putin-revolutionizing-information-warfare/379880/.
11 Igor Panarin, ‘SMI, Propaganda I informatsionnije vojni’, Litres, 2017; Jolanta Darczewska, ‘The anatomy of 
Russian information warfare: the Crimean operation. A case study’, Point of View 42: 5, May 2014, pp. 5–37; 
Igor Panarin, ‘Vtoraja mirovaja informatsionaja vojna—vojna protil Rosii’, Km.ru, 10 Jan. 2012, http://www.
km.ru/node/631035/c.
12 Tatiana Sergeevna Kovaleva, quoted in Rolf Fredheim, ‘Filtering foreign media content: how Russian news 
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Both the western and the Russia-favoured conceptions of information warfare 
share the assumption that waves of ‘weaponized’ information are generated by 
the state or state-sponsored agents.13 From this perspective, civilian support for 
or mistrust towards governments is acknowledged, but citizens are mainly seen 
as targets for manipulation in large-scale online information operations. Few 
scholars and security practitioners have systematically explored the active role 
citizens actually play, as social media ‘users who are not professionally active in 
politics but express political opinions or comment on events’.14 
This article presents a different understanding of digital (dis)information by 
examining the role and scale of citizen engagement in relation to state and commer-
cial media during an international conflict.15 We have selected one of the most 
controversial examples of information warfare in the Ukrainian crisis: the downing 
of the Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 (MH17) in the Ukrainian war zone in 2014. This 
case is relevant for the exploration of digital disinformation during international 
conflicts since information about the event has generally been seen to come from 
sources within, or close to, governments. We focus specifically on the social media 
network Twitter, which differs from Facebook and the Russian social media site 
VKontakte (similar to Facebook) in that it centres on news sharing and has the ability 
to facilitate global engagement among audiences in Russia, Ukraine and the West.
To this day, different media outlets, public officials and activists are supplying 
the global online public with different, often contradictory, answers to the key 
question: who shot down flight MH17 on 18 July 2014, killing the 298  civilians on 
board? One of the dominant narratives, largely supported by Russian mainstream 
media, suggests that Ukrainian forces were responsible for shooting down the 
plane.16 The opposing narrative, largely supported by the Ukrainian  government, 
citizen activists, and citizen journalist collectives such as Bellingcat, holds Russian 
separatists or the Russian government responsible.17 Depending on the answer to 
this question, the parties involved will be found either responsible or not responsible 
for the MH17 plane crash—and, subsequently, guilty or not guilty of promoting 
false information about one of the most important events in the Ukrainian crisis. 
The article proceeds as follows. First, we provide brief background to the MH17 
incident and the way in which the notion of information warfare has hitherto 
been understood. We point to the methodological limitations and empirical blind 
spots of this state-centric concept and propose instead to conceptualize citizens 
as curators of (dis)information. Then we move on to present our research design, 
agencies repurpose western news reporting’, Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society 1: 1, 2015, pp.  37–39.
13 Thornton, ‘The changing nature’; Spiers, ‘NATO and information warfare’, Panarin, ‘Vtoraja mirovaja’; 
Taylor, Munitions of the mind.
14 Julian Ausserhofer and Axel Maireder, ‘National politics on Twitter’, Information, Communication and Society 16: 
3, 2013, p. 298.
15 For distinctions among state, market and civil society, see Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil society and 
political theory (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), p. ix.
16 Sarah Oates, ‘Russian media in the digital age: propaganda rewired’, Russian Politics 1: 4, 2016, pp. 398–417; 
Irina Khaldarova and Mervi Pantti, ‘Fake news: the narrative battle over the Ukrainian conflict’, Journalism 
Practice 10: 7, April 2016, pp. 891–901.
17 Matt Sienkiewicz, ‘Open BUK: digital labor, media investigation and the downing of MH17’, Critical Studies 
in Media Communication 32: 3, July 2015, pp. 208–23.
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which draws on a dataset of approximately 950,000 tweets related to the MH17 
event. In the third section we present our findings, using social network analysis to 
decipher the network of retweets and identify its core of 2,434 most engaged users. 
In the fourth and final section, we discuss the results of our enquiry. Our findings 
clearly show that citizens are not just the purveyors of government messages; 
they actually generate the most popular content about the MH17 event among 
the most engaged Twitter users. Citizens are curators of both disinformation and 
counter-disinformation, even in the context of state-sponsored information and 
state-controlled media. 
Information warfare and the case of MH17
On 17 July 2014, four months into the war between Russian-backed separatists 
and the Ukrainian military, a Malaysian Airlines passenger flight (MH17) was 
shot down over Ukraine, killing all 298 passengers and crew members on board, 
including 193 Dutch, 43 Malaysian, 27 Australian, 12 Indonesian, 10 British and 
13 citizens with other nationalities.18 There was a clear global consensus that the 
crash was a tragedy; but in the hours following the event rival explanations of its 
cause began to circulate on social media. Western media outlets claimed that the 
plane was brought down by pro-Russian separatists. The Russian government, on 
the other hand, claimed that the Ukrainian military had shot down the plane. The 
downing of MH17 helped turn the Ukrainian crisis into an international conflict, 
prompting the EU and NATO to introduce tougher sanctions against Russia. 
Meanwhile, the Russian government maintained (and continues to maintain) that 
no missile had crossed from Russia into Ukraine.
In 2015, following several months of investigation, the Dutch Safety Board 
brought out its final report on the cause of the MH17 crash. It concluded that the 
plane had been shot down by a missile launched by a BUK surface-to-air system.19 
In September 2016, a Dutch-led joint investigating team ( JIT)—which included 
police and judicial authorities from Australia, Belgium, Malaysia, the Netherlands 
and Ukraine—presented the results of its investigation into the crash. These results 
were based on extensive forensic analysis, audio intersections, and more than 100 
interviews with eyewitnesses and other informants. The JIT found that flight MH17 
was shot down by a missile from an area controlled by pro-Russian separatist rebels. 
The investigation discovered that the BUK had been transported from the Russian 
Federation to a separatist-controlled area, and, after the downing of MH17, had 
been returned to Russia.20 The JIT linked the missile system to Russia’s 53rd anti-
aircraft missile brigade based in Kursk in the Russian  Federation.21  Subsequently, 
18 Dutch Safety Board, Crash of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 (The Hague, 2015), https://www.onderzoeksraad.
nl/uploads/phase-docs/1006/debcd724fe7breport-mh17-crash.pdf?s=678D995FE7E3080B6256880A456CED9
59FE4ECBC, p. 27
19 Dutch Safety Board, Crash of Malaysian Airlines.
20 Joint Investigation Team ( JIT), Presentation preliminary results criminal investigation MH17, 28 Sept. 2016, https://
www.om.nl/@96066/presentation/.
21 Joint Investigation Team ( JIT), Update in criminal investigation MH17 disaster, 24 May 2018, https://www.om.nl/
vaste-onderdelen/zoeken/@103183/update-criminal/.
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Australia and the Netherlands stated that they held Russia responsible under inter-
national law.22 In 2018, referring to the JIT’s findings, the G7 called for Russia to 
‘account for its role’ in the MH17 affair.23
This article accepts the JIT’s findings as reliable and accurate. Accordingly, as 
will be further explained in the section on methods below, social media posts that 
question the JIT findings (that the plane was shot down from territory controlled 
by Russian separatists using Russian weapons) are seen as examples of pro-Russian 
disinformation. An example is the Twitter post: ‘#Ukraine MH17 may be CIA 
false flag and it ain’t flying Alex Jones’ Infowars: There’s a war on for your mind!’ 
Here, the user refers to the conspirationalist American site InfoWars, which claims 
that the CIA shot down the plane in order to discredit Russia, without counter-
balancing the claim. For that reason, this tweet is seen to represent disinformation.
Understanding information warfare in the Ukraine crisis
The burgeoning literature on digital information warfare sees civil society as the 
main target of disinformation. However, in our view the role of citizens has not 
yet been fully explored. Most research on the online spread of pro-Kremlin infor-
mation tends to focus on state agents or state-controlled agents.24 This tendency is 
particularly prevalent in work carried out in political science and security studies 
that explores the roles played by the military, established political decision-
makers or government-controlled news media in Russia.25 While they may differ 
in approach, these studies of pro-Kremlin disinformation share the underlying 
assumption that the Russian government pursues its political and military goals 
by mobilizing support among the civilian population; and that this is achieved 
through disinformation and manipulation in conventional and digital media. 
However, few empirical studies actually examine how citizens are mobilized and 
what role they play. 
Studies of pro-Kremlin disinformation—in the context of the increasing 
hostility between the West and Russia—can be grouped into three categories. 
One category of scholarship concentrates on strategic narratives and disinforma-
tion discourses developed by the Kremlin or state-controlled Russian media. For 
example, in her analysis of Russian media and the MH17 crash, Sarah Oates finds 
22 Shaun Walker, ‘MH17: Australia and Netherlands accuse Russia of complicity’, Guardian, 25 May 2018, https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/25/mh17-australia-and-netherlands-accuse-russia-of-complicity.
23 Agence France-Presse, ‘Russia must “account for role” in shooting down MH17, says G7’, Guardian, 16 July 
2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/16/russia-must-account-for-role-in-shooting-down-
mh17-says-g7.
24 Thornton, ‘The changing nature’; Alexander Lanoszka, ‘Russian hybrid warfare and extended deterrence in 
eastern Europe’, International Affairs 92: 1, Jan. 2016, pp. 175–95; Niekerk, ‘Information warfare’; Ralph D. 
Thiele, Crisis in Ukraine: the emergence of hybrid warfare, ISPSW Strategy Series (May 2015), https://www.files.
ethz.ch/isn/190792/347_Thiele_RINSA.pdf.
25 Christina Cottiero, Katherine Kucharski, Evgenia Olimpieva and Robert W. Orttung, ‘War of words: the 
impact of Russian state television on the Russian internet’, Nationalities Papers 43: 4, March 2015, pp. 533–55; 
Thornton, ‘The changing nature’; Pomerantsev, ‘The Kremlin’s information war’; Fredheim, ‘Filtering 
foreign media content’; Elizaveta Gaufman, ‘Memory, media, securitization: Russian media framing of the 
Ukrainian crisis’, Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society 1: 1, 2015, pp. 141–74; Stephen J. Cimbala, 
‘Sun Tzu and salami tactics? Vladimir Putin and military persuasion in Ukraine’, Journal of Slavic Military 
 Studies 27: 3, July 2014, pp. 359–79.
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that Russian state elites have consolidated ‘information dominance’ over citizens.26 
Studying primarily state television and its response to online information on the 
MH17 event, Oates concludes that the Russian state has effectively ‘rewired’ its 
propaganda to take account of the global information flows and domestic online 
content. While Oates’s tracing of the strategic narrative is very compelling, she 
examines only the way in which particular ideas are projected, primarily on state 
television; she does not look into who actually spreads them online. 
The second category of scholarship analyses the specific techniques used by the 
Russian regime to spread disinformation online—including trolls, bots, influence 
campaigns, hacking and smear campaigns, and fake news.27 Here, scholars have 
emphasized the continuation of Cold War propaganda strategies.28 As Sanovich 
puts it, ‘the ability of Russian propaganda to infiltrate dark corners of social media 
platforms—from the alt-right subreddits to the far-left Twitter threads—with 
self-serving narratives should not be surprising: this is Russian modus operandi in 
more traditional media too’.29 While these studies recognize the important role of 
civilian support, they tend to conceptualize civil society in passive terms, and see 
social media as a fertile ground for state-controlled flows of information. 
The third category of scholarship focuses specifically on the use of disinforma-
tion in the conflict over Ukraine and the Russian annexation of Crimea. These 
studies interpret the online battle in military and strategic terms, as a conflict 
driven by state agents in ‘hybrid warfare’—that is, the combination of conven-
tional deterrence using guerrilla tactics and information warfare.30 In such 
conceptualizations, the civilian population is crucial, but it is still understood as 
something that can be easily manipulated. For example, in Alexander Lanoszka’s 
convincing analysis of hybrid warfare, Ukraine is described as having a ‘weak civil 
society’ with many cleavages where distrust can be exploited by the belligerents.31
Other scholars have argued that studies of the online struggle over Ukraine 
should give more prominence to the online activity of ordinary citizens.32 As 
Mejias and Vokuev explain, citizens use social media to generate, consume or 
distribute false information, contributing to a new order ‘where disinformation 
acquires a certain authority’.33 Yet Mejias and Vokuev offer limited evidence on 
who these citizens are, and how they relate to state elites or media. In another inter-
26 Oates, ‘Russian media’, p. 399.
27 See e.g. Peter N. Tanchak, ‘The invisible front: Russia, trolls, and the information war against Ukraine’, in 
Olga Bertelson, ed., Revolution and war in contemporary Ukraine (Stuttgart: Ibidem Verlag, 2017). For a differ-
ent reading of trolling, emphasizing differences with past strategies, see Xymena Kurowska and Anatoly 
Reshetnikov, ‘Neutrollization: industrialized trolling as a pro-Kremlin strategy of desecuritization’, Security 
Dialogue, forthcoming.
28 Andrew Hoskins and Ben O’Loughlin, ‘Arrested war: the third phase of mediatization’, Information, Commu-
nication and Society 18:11, Aug. 2015, pp. 1320–38.
29 Sergey Sanovich, Computational propaganda in Russia: the origins of digital misinformation, Oxford Computa-
tional Research Project, working paper no. 2017.3, http://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/ 
89/2017/06/Comprop-Russia.pdf, p. 5. 
30 Lanoszka, ‘Russian hybrid warfare’, see also Sten Rynning, ‘The false promise of continental concert: Russia, 
the West and the necessary balance of power’, International Affairs 91: 3, May 2015, pp. 539–52.
31 Lanoszka, ‘Russian hybrid warfare’, pp. 178–9.
32 See e.g. Khaldarova and Pantti, ‘Fake news’.
33 Ulises A. Mejias and Nikolai E. Vokuev, ‘Disinformation and the media: the case of Russia and Ukraine’, 
Media, Culture and Society 39: 7, Oct. 2017, pp. 1027–42 at p. 1029.
INTA94_5_01_Adler_Nissen.indd   980 31/08/2018   11:45
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/ia/article-abstract/94/5/975/5092080 by guest on 12 Septem
ber 2018
State, media and civil society in the information warfare over Ukraine
981
International Affairs 94: 5, 2018
esting study, Toal and O’Loughlin examine the effects on citizens of exposure to 
television, specifically how it influences their opinion of who is responsible for the 
crash of flight MH17. But they do not analyse online debates.34
Citizen engagement with pro-Kremlin online disinformation, then, remains 
relatively uncharted territory. This leaves a number of questions open, including 
which profiles are most active in propagating disinformation online.
Conceptualizing citizen curators
Social media challenges the control that traditional media previously had over the 
production and dissemination of news. The digital age facilitates user-generated 
content and visibility as citizens actively search for, and produce, new information 
in an environment characterized by growing distrust of professional journalism 
and established authorities. This development has challenged the information 
gatekeeping role of professional media, and has enabled citizens, social movements, 
voluntary groups and citizen journalist collectives to move from being passive 
audiences to active curators of information.
‘Curation’ is the term that has come to be used to describe the way organiza-
tions and individuals behave online on a range of digital platforms from Wikipedia 
to Instagram. Curation was traditionally linked to the care and preservation of 
artefacts in museums or galleries. But a curator is now seen as someone who 
‘adds cultural value to artefacts when drawing individual items together into 
a collection, interpreting their relevance to a theme [and] then re-representing 
them through a story or visuals’.35 On social media, curation involves producing, 
selecting and spreading information online.36 So on Twitter, a tweet or a retweet 
can be seen an act of information curation. In the case of MH17, curation is about 
actively shaping competing narratives about why the plane crashed. 
However, just as the museum and art worlds are stratified into hierarchies,37 
so online curators differ in their influence. Social media sites are not egalitarian 
platforms where attention is distributed equally among users; these sites are 
embedded in pre-existing inequality structures, which explains why the most 
popular users in the entire Twitter sphere are primarily celebrities from the enter-
tainment industry, established political figures or large news corporations.38 States 
and corporations have the economic resources to promote content as well as engage 
professional staff to manage their accounts. Such resources are less accessible to 
ordinary citizens. Consequently, the struggle for visibility takes place in a network 
where some curators are more capable of shaping the public debate than others.
34 Gerard Toal and John O’Loughlin, ‘“Why did MH17 crash?”: blame attribution, television news and public 
opinion in southeastern Ukraine, Crimea and the de facto states of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria’, 
Geopolitics, published online 22 Sept. 2017, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14650045.2017.1364238.
35 StefanNowatny, quoted in Anita Howarth, ‘Exploring a curatorial turn in journalism’, M/C Journal 18: 4, 2015, 
http://journal.media-culture.org.au/index.php/mcjournal/article/view/1004>.
36 Sarah Pedersen and Simon Burnett, ‘“Citizen curation” in online discussions of Donald Trump’s presidency: 
sharing the news on Mumsnet’, Digital Journalism 6: 5, 2018, pp. 545–62, https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.201
7.1399806.
37 Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: a social critique of the judgment of taste (London: Routledge, 1984).
38 Christian Fuchs, Social media: a critical introduction (London: Sage, 2017), p. 232.
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By using the concept of curation, we are not suggesting that citizens are isolated 
from discourses propagated by governments and mainstream media. Moreover, 
the fact that citizens curate information originally produced by governments or 
government-sponsored agents—while also generating their own content—is in 
line with previous studies of information warfare. However, some citizens may 
have interpreted the MH17 crash in accordance with the Kremlin’s narrative (or 
with the findings of the JIT) without ever being directly exposed to, or manipu-
lated by, news sources loyal to the Kremlin (or to the JIT). Indeed, many of the 
most prolific disseminators of disinformation use sophisticated arguments that 
they construct—or partly construct—themselves. Yet so far we have had limited 
insight into how, and to what extent, citizens actively shape the stream of infor-
mation through curation. 
Methods and data
To understand the interrelations between state, citizens and media in the spread of 
disinformation, we have drawn on social network analysis. In recent years, social 
network analysis has become more central to International Relations and security 
studies. It has been used to analyse terrorist networks and gang-related crime,39 
and it has been applied to social media data on foreign policy issues. To our knowl-
edge, social network analysis has not yet been applied in scholarly analyses of 
pro-Kremlin digital disinformation. One of the merits of social network analysis 
is that it is deeply data-driven. There are few theoretical assumptions other than 
the ideas that people relate to each other, and that the structure and strength of 
these relations matter. One of the most important ways in which people relate to 
each other is by sharing information. For this reason, we believe social network 
analysis is particularly suitable for a study of the curation of digital  disinformation.
As noted above, we have chosen to focus on Twitter as it remains one of the most 
important sites for global debates on ‘truths’ in international conflicts. Moreover, 
the debate on Twitter is embedded in narratives propagated by governments and 
mainstream media. In addition, it is possible to gather a large and  representative 
sample of tweets (unlike Facebook data, which are generally not so readily  accessible).
Our data consist of tweets starting from the day of the crash on 17 July 2014 
and ending on 9 December 2016. The dataset was collected using ‘Gardenhose’, a 
tool for downloading the platform’s public data and as such a part of Twitter’s own 
application programming interface (API).40 This approach generated a random 
sample of 10 per cent of all the tweets within the specified period that contained 
one or more keywords related to MH17 (in total 941,028 tweets). Specifically, we 
searched for at least one keyword or hashtag in the tweet or profile name that 
39 Carlo Morselli and David Décary-Hétu, ‘Crime facilitation purposes of social networking sites: a review and 
analysis of the “cyberbanging” phenomenon’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 24: 1, Feb. 2013, pp. 152–70; Thomas 
Zeitzoff, John Kelly and Gillad Lotan, ‘Using social media to measure foreign policy dynamics: an empirical 
analysis of the Iranian–Israeli confrontation (2012–13)’, Journal of Peace Research 52: 3, 2015, pp. 368–83.
40 We thank Professor Alan Mislove, Northeastern University, for access to MH17 tweets based on the Twitter 
Gardenhose feed. 
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related to MH17: MH17, MH17 (with Cyrillic letters), Malazijskij [and] Boeing 
(in Russian), #MH17, #Pray4MH17, #PrayforMH17. The hashtags and keywords 
were selected to make sure they clearly related to the crash of MH17 (and not the 
Ukraine crisis as such), and that they were neither pro-Ukrainian nor pro-Russian. 
To identify which users had the greatest impact, we analysed a network of 
retweets, where ‘nodes’ represent users and ‘edges’ (i.e. connections) represent 
retweets. We established the connection between two profiles by linking the Twitter 
handle name of the retweeted user with the handle name of the one who was being 
retweeted.41 By making the network directional, we were able to analyse the direc-
tion of the retweets, i.e. from whom to whom the particular tweet had travelled. 
We relied on the metric of ‘in-degree’, ‘out-degree’ and ‘betweenness’ centrality 
to analyse this directional network. The user’s out-degree centrality score repre-
sents the number of profiles that she has retweeted in the network. Users with 
high out-degree centrality are active in retweeting many different profiles. They 
play a crucial role in disseminating and amplifying already existing tweets. 
In-degree centrality refers to the number of accounts that have retweeted the user 
in question. Users with high in-degree centrality have a high ‘impact’ at the core 
of the network. In this case, impact refers to the ability to generate content that is 
retweeted throughout the network by many users. Accounts that have both high 
in-degree and low out-degree centrality generate popular content that is retweeted 
by many users, even though they themselves rarely retweet others. They are the 
most central curators of information. Normalized betweenness centrality, ranging 
from 0 to 1, indicates the extent to which the respective users are in ‘between’ 
other users in the network. Users with high betweenness centrality play an impor-
tant bridging role, because they often comprise the shortest path from one user to 
another in the network of information.42
Identifying the most engaged information curators
To identify which Twitter users are most engaged in the debate over the crash of 
flight MH17, we have used Stephen Seidman’s k-core method, which helped us to 
focus the analysis on the smaller, most engaged subset of the network.43 The k-core 
has been found to be the best measure for identifying the top-performing infor-
mation spreaders on social media.44 In a network such as Twitter, the centrality of 
a profile is a quantitative measure of how important the given profile is. A k-core 
is a maximal subset of the network where all nodes are connected to at least ‘k’ 
number of other nodes: so ‘k’ can be any whole number. In this case, two nodes 
are defined as ‘connected’ if one user retweets the other. We limited our analysis 
41 Few users change their handle names, so that they are represented with multiple nodes in the retweet network. 
This issue occurs rarely. Of the 450,605 profiles in the entire dataset with user IDs known to us, 4,173 have 
multiple handle names. This is equivalent to only 0.92 per cent. We limit the analysis to links between the 
users who retweet and the original sources of the tweets, leaving out the intermediary retweeters.
42 The formal description of the normalized betweenness score used in this study is available in the igraph package 
documentation: http://igraph.org/r/doc/betweenness.html.
43 Stephen B. Seidman, ‘Network structure and minimum degree’, Social Networks 5: 3, 1983, pp. 269–87.
44 Sen Pei, Lev Muchnik, José S. Andrade, Jr., Zhiming Zheng and Hernán A. Makse, ‘Searching for super-
spreaders of information in real-world social media’, Scientific Reports 4: 5547, 2014, pp. 1–12.
INTA94_5_01_Adler_Nissen.indd   983 31/08/2018   11:45
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/ia/article-abstract/94/5/975/5092080 by guest on 12 Septem
ber 2018
Yevgeniy Golovchenko, Mareike Hartmann and Rebecca Adler-Nissen
984
International Affairs 94: 5, 2018
to the core of the network by setting k equal to 10. In the following, we will 
simply refer to it as the k-10 core. In other words, the users in the k-10 core have 
themselves retweeted—or have been retweeted by—at least 10 other users. The 
entire network consists of 364,773 users (nodes) with 511,127 retweets (edges), and 
the k-10 core of the network comprises 2,434 profiles with 47,229 retweets. 
Due to the relatively high retweet threshold (k=10), the delimited subset of 
users differs from the entire Twitter network. The core consists of both high-
impact users who generate popular content and those who are highly active in 
disseminating tweets from other accounts. Each member of the group is there-
fore both more engaged in the public debate than the average Twitter user and 
more connected to other highly engaged users. The k-10 core is dominated by 
the use of English to an even greater extent than the entire retweet network. We 
define a user as belonging to a specific language group if at least 75 per cent of all 
original tweets posted by her are in the language. By this standard, 66.9 per cent 
of all users in the k-10 core are part of the English-speaking group (compared to 
50.8 per cent in the entire retweet network). Among the top five languages in 
the network core, English-speaking users are the most prevalent (66.9 per cent), 
followed by Russian- (13.2 per cent), Dutch- (9.7 per cent), German- (1.4 per cent) 
and Indonesian-speaking users (0.5 per cent). Our analysis is limited to the highly 
engaged and cohesive subset of users who are at the core of the predominantly 
English-speaking debate on the MH17 crash.
Results
In this section, we start by examining the polarization of the MH17 debate in the 
entire network. We then move on to analyse which type of profile (state, profes-
sional media, civil society group or citizen) is most influential in the cohesive core 
of the network, and what role they play when it comes to spreading different 
narratives about the MH17 crash.
Polarization and the representation of MH17 
To map the information struggle over the MH17 plane crash, we analysed the 
content of the tweets, how they relate to one another and who spreads them. 
We randomly sampled 10,000 tweets in English out of the 513,715 English tweets 
and retweets in the entire corpus. We limited our content analysis to English 
for pragmatic reasons—simply because it is the dominant language in the entire 
network as well as in the k-10 core. The tweet texts were manually coded using 
the following descriptors: 
(1) a pro-Ukrainian frame, where the Russian Federation or pro-Russian separat-
ists in Ukraine are explicitly or implicitly portrayed as responsible for the crash 
(10.3 per cent), for example:
Video - Missile that downed MH17 ‘was brought in from Russia’ @peterlane5news
RT @mashable: Ukraine: Audio recordings show pro-Russian rebels tried to hide #MH17 black boxes
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(2) a pro-Russian frame, where Ukrainian authorities, NATO or EU countries 
are explicitly or implicitly blamed for shooting down the plane (5.5 per cent), for 
example:
Detailed analysis: MH17 shot down by Ukrainian SU-25 cannon fire and air-to-air missile
Why the USA and Ukraine, NOT Russia, were probably behind the shooting down of flight #MH17
(3) a neutral frame, where neither Ukraine nor Russia or any others are blamed for 
shooting down the plane (84.2 per cent), for example:
#PrayForMH17 :(
RT @deserto_fox: Russian terrorist stole wedding ring from dead passenger #MH17
Since this article finds the investigations of the Dutch Safety Board and the JIT 
to be reliable, we refer to tweets as ‘pro-Russian disinformation’ in cases where 
the narrative deflects the blame away from the Kremlin by denying its involve-
ment in the incident and instead blames Ukraine or the West. It is important 
to note that users spreading pro-Kremlin disinformation about the MH17 crash 
cannot automatically be assumed to favour the Russian government; they may be 
critical towards the Kremlin when it comes to other issues or events. Furthermore, 
curators who spread pro-Russian tweets may not be intentionally misleading, 
since these users may be fully convinced of the truthfulness of the stories they are 
retweeting. The real motivation of each user remains unknown to us. Structurally, 
however, these tweets become part of a larger disinformation campaign, supported 
by Russian media loyal to the government and by Kremlin officials presumably 
aware of a situation that involves Russian armed forces. Willingly or unwillingly, 
Twitter users become part of this campaign by spreading disinformation. The same 
structural issue holds for users who spread pro-Ukrainian narratives.
Four coders were responsible for the coding, among them two of the authors. 
Prior to coding, coders went through a training phase where they could discuss 
and resolve conflicting interpretation of tweets. Because the randomly sampled, 
coded tweets appear in the total corpus multiple times (as duplicates and retweets), 
our final coded corpus consisted of 128,423 tweets, of which 10,000 were coded as 
‘pro-Ukrainian’ and 3,442 were coded as ‘pro-Russian’. By transferring these codes 
from the entire dataset to the limited subset, we were able to categorize 10 per cent 
of the retweets in the k-10 core. The connection between two users was labelled 
either pro-Russian or pro-Ukrainian if at least one of the retweets connecting 
the two contained the relevant framing.45 Figure 1 illustrates the results of our 
analysis. It clearly reflects a polarization of the MH17 network into two opposing 
clusters. In the k-10 core (counting 2,434 members), the pro-Russian disinforma-
tion frames (black) are concentrated in the cluster to the right, where the users 
with highest in-degree centrality predominantly blame Ukraine or the West for 
the deaths of civilians in the MH17 crash. The pro-Ukrainian counter-disinfor-
45 We saw no instances of two users being connected simultaneously by ‘pro-Ukrainian’ and ‘pro-Russian’ 
retweets. 
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mation frames (grey)—representing users who blame Russia or Russian separa-
tists for the downing of the flight—are concentrated on the opposite side. Both 
disinformation and counter-disinformation are concentrated in their respective 
opposing poles, with relatively few direct links between them. 
Note: Nodes represent profiles. A connection between two nodes is established if one profile has 
retweeted the other profile at least once. Connection weight reflects number of retweets. The graph 
includes only those connections where the retweets have been annotated as either ‘pro-Ukrainian’ 
(grey) or ‘pro-Russian’ (black). Node and profile name size reflect impact (in degree). The metric 
is computed using all 47,229 retweets and is therefore not limited to manually annotated English 
tweets. The full profile names do not reflect real names. For instance, ‘Vladimir Putin’ is a 
‘pro-Ukrainian’ troll account under the handle name @DarthPutinKGB.
Figure 1: K-10 core retweet network: disinformation (black) and  counter- 
disinformation (grey)
Which users are most influential?
We then moved on to examine which type of profile was most influential in the 
network. To do so, the 2,434 profiles in the cohesive core had to be manually 
coded by two coders into the subcategories of ‘state’, ‘civil society’ and ‘media’.46 
Our coding was based on the profiles’ self-description, reflecting how the users 
choose to portray themselves online. Some users might describe themselves as 
‘journalists’ even if they have not been formally educated as such and are not 
employed by any media entity in this function. Going by Twitter names, current 
‘avatars’ and the self-descriptions of the profiles, the following codes were used to 
identify the profiles with these results:
1 state institutions (1.6 per cent): governmental or intergovernmental institutions
2 public officials (1.2 per cent): ministers, governmental advisers, and public officials 
working in intergovernmental institutions
3 politicians (0.6 per cent): members of, or candidates for, national/local parlia-
ments, and politicians in international or supranational bodies
46 The coding process is fully described in the codebook for manual annotation available on our project website: 
https://disinfo.ku.dk/. 
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4 commercial and state media (6.6 per cent): commercial or state-owned newspapers, 
radio stations, TV channels or news websites
5 journalists (6.2 per cent): journalists, editors, correspondents, columnists, etc. 
(excludes profiles who describe themselves as ‘citizen journalists’ as well as 
bloggers and journalists working for non-profit volunteer news sites)
6 civil society groups (2.5 per cent): NGOs, grassroots organizations, social move -
ments, non-profit research centres, non-profit volunteer news sites, and citizen 
journalist groups
7 citizens (74.4 per cent): individual users who are not journalists, politicians or 
public officials (includes users whose profiles lack self-description)
8 other (1.1 per cent): profiles that fall outside any of the categories listed above 
(e.g. universities, think-tanks and political parties)
9 removed from Twitter (5.8 per cent): profiles no longer available on the platform. 
On both the disinformation and the counter-disinformation sides, we found many 
citizen and civil society group profiles. To further ensure that the citizen profiles 
we identified were not bots, we used the Botometer API.47 The Botometer tool 
assigns a score between 0 and 1 to a user profile reflecting the likelihood that the 
profile is a bot. The score is calculated on the basis of a wide range of parameters, 
including information about the network, tweet content and activity patterns.48 
Only 2 per cent of these citizen profiles in the k-10 core had a bot score higher than 
0.6. While the Botometer’s predictions are far from perfect, the bot score distribu-
tion on the k-10 core suggested that a majority of the users classified as ‘citizens’ 
were indeed likely to be humans.49 What we found more difficult to determine 
was whether the citizen accounts were covertly managed by government agents 
to manipulate the public. However, in 2017 Twitter provided the US Congress 
with a list of 2,752 human-controlled Twitter profiles linked to Russia’s Internet 
Research Agency (IRA), popularly known as the ‘Russian Troll Farm’.50 Interest-
ingly, none of these trolls appeared in the k-10 core. Although it is impossible to 
determine with complete certainty, we found no indication that any of the citizen 
profiles in our sample were managed by the IRA.
Media profiles, including media outlets and individual journalists, represented 
13 per cent of the users in the k-10 core. The media cluster appeared to be divided 
into two opposing poles: a group of western media, dominated by a pro-Ukrainian 
framing of the crash, on the one hand, and the pro-Russian RT on the other 
hand. As reflected in table 1, commercial and state media in the k-10 core tend 
not to pass on information by retweeting other users. Instead, individual journal-
47 See the Botometer website: https://botometer.iuni.iu.edu/#!.
48 Onur Varol, Emilio Ferrara, Clayton A. Davis, Filippo Menczer and Alessandro Flammini, ‘Online human–
bot interactions: detection, estimation and characterization’, Proceedings of the International Conference on Web 
and Social Media (ICWSM), March 2017, https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.03107.
49 Only 8.8 per cent of citizen profiles have a bot score of above 0.5. The low proportion could be caused by 
Twitter systematically removing bots. We can only categorize a profile if it has not been removed during the 
manual coding. Many of the removed accounts may have been bots. The removed profiles do not play a central 
role in the network. 
50 The US Congress has publicized the IRA list: see https://democrats-intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
exhibit_b.pdf. 
INTA94_5_01_Adler_Nissen.indd   987 31/08/2018   11:45
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/ia/article-abstract/94/5/975/5092080 by guest on 12 Septem
ber 2018
Yevgeniy Golovchenko, Mareike Hartmann and Rebecca Adler-Nissen
988
International Affairs 94: 5, 2018
ists may play a bridging role in the network as indicated by their high between-
ness score, offering a potential flow of information between the two opposing 
poles of disinformation and counter-disinformation. However, further research 
is needed to conclusively establish the role of individual journalists as bridges 
between opposing views on MH17.
Citizens and informational impact
Interestingly, citizens as a combined group have the highest impact when it 
comes to generating popular content in the core of the retweet network. Out 
of the total 47,229 retweets that connect the k-10 core group, 27,195 are retweets 
of posts that have been uploaded by citizens. This is illustrated in figure 2. As a 
group, citizens are 4.3 times more likely to be retweeted than commercial and 
state media profiles. 
While a citizen profile is retweeted by only 9.6 users (on average)—compared 
to 32.4 for journalist profiles—citizens have the highest impact of any group. The 
highly central role of citizens and civil society in the network core cannot be 
attributed to the large number of citizens alone. The central role of citizens is 
surprisingly high even when the overall number of citizens is taken into account. 
Figure 3 provides an overview of the top 50 profiles with the highest in-degree 
scores—i.e. the number of users who have retweeted the relevant profile in the 
k-10 core and in the entire retweet network as such. Of the top 50 profiles in 
the k-10 core, 31 portray themselves as ‘civil society’ accounts, including 6 ‘civil 
society groups’ and 25 ‘individual citizens’. If the sheer number of citizens alone 
drove the centrality of citizen and civil society accounts, we would see the same 
pattern in the entire retweet network, where the proportion of citizen profiles is 
likely to be even higher than in the core. Yet, surprisingly, when we looked at the 
entire network, we saw that the number of citizen profiles in the list of the 50 
Table 1: Profile type ranked by normalized betweenness centrality
Profile type No. of 
profiles
In-degree 
mean
Out-degree 
mean
Betweenness 
mean
Civil society groups 62 32.4 8.1 0.00145
Journalists 151 30.6 4.8 0.00074
Citizens 1,811 9.6 15.6 0.00073
Public officials 29 29.5 3.9 0.00058
Removed from Twitter 141 9.4 14.0 0.00043
Politicians 15 23.5 3.9 0.00042
Commercial/state media 160 29.4 2.9 0.00023
State institutions 39 22.5 3.1 0.00014
Other 26 12.0 10.4 0.00014
All 2,434 13.4 13.4 0.00068
Note: The metrics are based on all 47,229 retweets in the k-10 core – including non-English 
retweets that have not been included in the content analysis. 
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Figure 2: Number of times a profile type has been retweeted in the k-10 core 
Note: The numbers include all 47,229 retweets in the k-10 core—including non-English retweets that 
have not been included in the content analysis. 
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Figure 3: Top 50 profiles in the k-10 core and the whole retweet network 
(ranked by in-degree centrality)
Note: In this figure, ‘citizens’ refers to both individual citizen accounts and civil society group 
 accounts. ‘Commercial and state media’ includes group accounts as well as individual journalists.
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most central users had dropped from 25 to 10, whereas the number of commercial 
and state media profiles had increased from 7 to 23.
This suggests that citizens are a central source of information at the core of the 
online debate about MH17, where many highly engaged users interact with each 
other. Established media profiles, on the other hand, are more dominant outside 
the network core—on the periphery of the full network. Media profiles have a 
stronger reach among the more isolated and less active profiles, who are connected 
to only a few other users. 
This finding leads us to the question of which profiles are the most significant 
in spreading disinformation and counter-disinformation. We analysed the disin-
formation network (the network based only on tweets coded as pro-Russian) and 
the counter-disinformation network (the network based only on tweets coded as 
pro-Ukrainian) separately. Not surprisingly, we found RT to be the most impor-
tant profile among the top 50 profiles (the profiles with the highest in-degree 
scores) in the disinformation network—when all non-disinformation tweets were 
filtered out. Interestingly, however, 39 out of the 50 most central profiles in the 
disinformation network were citizens. Apart from the citizens’ profiles, the top 
50 profiles included three commercial and state media profiles (RT, Sputnik and 
Ruptly); six journalist profiles; and two profiles that had been removed from 
Twitter at the time of coding. This suggests that individual citizens are much 
more central as sources of disinformation stories than we would expect to be the 
case from the literature on information warfare. Thus, civil society is not just a 
target for information warfare, but appears as the most central producer of disinfor-
mation—even in a social media network like Twitter, biased towards established 
media. Of course, users might still have been manipulated prior to tweeting disin-
formation; even so, while civil society might be ‘weak’, our study clearly shows 
that citizens are very active in the online debate, and create many of the most 
popular tweets themselves. 
When we looked at which profiles were most active in spreading counter-disin-
formation (i.e. information that supports the findings of the JIT), we found that 
citizens also play an important role (19 out of the top 50 profiles). This means that 
citizens are not only the most central profiles when it comes to spreading disinfor-
mation; they play an equally important role when it comes to countering disin-
formation. The most important profile in the counter-disinformation network 
is the journalistic civil society group ‘Ukraine Reporter’. This is followed by the 
individual account of Eliot Higgins, the founder of the citizen journalist group 
Bellingcat, together with that group’s own account, @bellingcat. Among the 
top 50 profiles in the counter-disinformation network are 19 citizen profiles; 11 
journalist profiles; 10 commercial and state media profiles; 6 civil society group 
profiles; and 4 public official / state institution profiles. This leads us to conclude 
that citizens dominate the core of the online debate over the MH17 crash. 
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Discussion: citizen curators of (dis)information
Our analysis shows that neither disinformation nor counter-disinformation is as 
strongly state-driven as is often assumed in the case of the Ukraine conflict. Our 
analysis also points to the grey zones between citizen comments and journalism, 
as well as to the methodological problem of labelling different profiles over time. 
For example, the second most retweeted pro-Kremlin profile (after RT) belongs 
to Graham W. Phillips, a British self-styled journalist who travels around eastern 
Ukraine and Russia. Phillips was employed part-time by RT until 2014, and from 
2014 to 2015 by Zvezda,51 but he operates as an individual. Nevertheless, we have 
chosen to label him a journalist, to ensure that we do not overestimate the number 
of citizens.52 Interestingly, the most retweeted profile in the entire dataset is 
Eliot Higgins, a central member of the Bellingcat citizen journalist group that 
conducts open-source investigations on social media. Over time, Bellingcat has 
become professionalized, but it started out as a small civil society group. Drawing 
on Google satellite imagery and geo-tagged photographs, Higgins’s tweets have 
become a key source of information in the public debate about what happened to 
flight MH17 and have helped official investigations into the downing of MH17. 
According to Higgins, this would not have been possible without ‘social media 
posts from local citizens in Eastern Ukraine and the Russian border region with 
Ukraine’.53 
Both Higgins and Phillips, operating on two different sides of the Twitter 
sphere, are representatives of the quasi-professional role that some individuals 
assume in the battle for truth about the MH17 crash. They also illustrate that in 
the case of the MH17 incident both disinformation and counter-disinformation 
are, to a large degree, carried out not only by professional journalists and govern-
ments, but also by individuals. To reduce these profiles to passive purveyors of 
state interests would be to ignore the fact that they produce and curate the most 
influential pieces of information about the incident, whether this information is 
false or not.
Our findings resonate with, and add greater nuance to, research within commu-
nications and media studies on digital misinformation. For several years, media 
scholars have explored the way citizens make editorial judgements on social media, 
concluding that social media websites and blogs, which allow for the bypassing of 
traditional gatekeepers, contribute to the dissemination of misinformation.54 Yet, 
as we have shown here, citizens are as active in correcting disinformation online 
as they are in spreading disinformation.
51 A channel owned by the Russian Ministry of Defence.
52 Max Seddon, ‘How a British blogger became an unlikely star of the Ukraine conflict—and Russia Today’, 
BuzzFeed News, 20 May 2014, https://www.buzzfeed.com/maxseddon/how-a-british-blogger-became-an-
unlikely-star-of-the-ukraine?utm_term=.ielXOd7Ea#.jpBz9n4aO. 
53 Eliot Higgins, ‘A new age of open source investigation: international examples’, in A. Babak Akhgar, P. Saskia 
Bayerl and Fraser Sampson, eds, Open source intelligence investigation: advanced sciences and technologies for security 
application (Cham: Springer, 2016), p. 189.
54 Jane B. Singer, ‘User-generated visibility: secondary gatekeeping in a shared media space’, New Media and 
Society 16: 1, 2014, pp. 55–73.
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The data do not offer a decisive answer to the question why citizens play such 
an important role in spreading disinformation and countering it at the core of 
the MH17 network. Staying with the concept of curation, the distinct credibility 
attaching to citizens may be the driving mechanism. Historically, intelligence 
services and propaganda institutions have posed as ordinary citizens to assume a 
credibility that they lack in their own roles.55 Moreover, credibility is becoming 
an increasingly scarce commodity for governments around the world. According 
to Pew Research, levels of trust in the government are declining in the United 
States.56 Gallup polls also indicate that trust in mass media among Americans has 
been trending downwards during the last two decades, reaching a historical low 
in 2016, when only 32 per cent of respondents replied that they had ‘a great deal’ 
or ‘a fair amount’ of trust in the mass media.57 Seen from this perspective, the lack 
of trust in government institutions and mass media organizations may strengthen 
civil society actors as an alternative source of information. During international 
conflicts, when national media and governments from competing countries seek to 
weaken each other’s credibility, we would expect online audiences to contest not 
only competing ‘truths’ about political or military events, but also the credibility 
of well-known civil society actors, including their relation to the less credible 
government and media institutions. And indeed, there are many instances in the 
MH17 case where key civil society actors accuse each other of being funded by 
government institutions such as the CIA or the Kremlin. 
Why do citizens curate information in ways that amplify or counter pro-Kremlin 
disinformation? There are many possible reasons why ordinary citizens may 
engage in spreading false news. For instance, Vosoughi and colleagues argue that 
false news spreads faster and more broadly on Twitter because it appears more 
novel and enticing than true news.58 While we cannot compare our results directly 
to this study owing to differences in research design, the argument resonates with 
the MH17 case, where many of the tweets are hyper-sensational. Some of the 
pro-Kremlin tweets claim that the CIA set up the crash to delegitimize Russia; 
that the flight was shot down by Ukrainian Nazis; or that the flight was filled with 
corpses before take-off in Amsterdam. However, the sensational character of these 
stories does not itself explain why some individuals engage in spreading false news 
and others actively counter the stories.
One of the main driving factors behind citizen engagement in (dis)information 
on the MH17 incident could be users’ political alignment. A growing body of 
literature suggests that people are more likely to believe or engage with informa-
55 Garry King, Jennifer Pan and Margaret E. Roberts, ‘How the Chinese government fabricates social media 
posts for strategic distraction, not engaged argument’, American Political Science Review 111: 3, 2017, pp. 
484–501; Franziska Keller, David Schoch, Sebastian Stier and Jung Hwang Yang, ‘How to manipulate social 
media: analyzing political Astroturfing using ground truth data from South Korea’, Proceedings of the Eleventh 
ICWSM Conference, Palo Alto, California (The AAAI Press, 2017), pp. 564–67.
56 Public Trust in Government: 1958–2017 (Washington DC: Pew Research Center, 14 Dec. 2017), http://www.
people-press.org/2017/12/14/public-trust-in-government-1958-2017/ .
57 Art Swift, Democrats’ confidence in mass media rises sharply from 2016 (Washington DC: Gallup, 21 Sept. 2017), 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/219824/democrats-confidence-mass-media-rises-sharply-2016.aspx.
58 Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy and Sinan Aral, ‘The spread of true and false news online’, Science 359: 6380, 2018, 
pp. 1146–51.
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tion that aligns with their pre-existing knowledge, experience or political views, 
a mechanism described as politically motivated ‘selective exposure’.59 The term 
refers to a well-documented phenomenon, namely that individuals often tend to 
expose themselves to information sources that match their own political views 
more than to politically discordant sources.60 Accordingly, we would expect 
highly conservative users—e.g. those with anti-globalist or anti-EU convictions—
to be more engaged in producing and disseminating (false and true) pro-Russian 
content, because the Kremlin is ideologically aligned with these users, promoting 
itself as a challenge to global elites and the EU. In contrast, the Ukrainian govern-
ment brands its country as an aspiring progressive nation set on a course towards 
joining the EU. Similarly, users with political views that are discordant with the 
Kremlin’s brand of conservatism and anti-globalism may be more likely to spread 
(true or false) information that contests the Kremlin’s legitimacy. These expecta-
tions need to be tested empirically by future studies. 
Conclusion
Information warfare is not what it used to be. In the age of social media, 
individual citizens can be more influential than states and professional mass media 
in spreading information. Analysing the opposing ‘truths’ about who was respon-
sible for shooting down flight MH17 over Ukraine in 2014, we have explored 
which Twitter profiles were most active in spreading (dis)information about the 
crash. While it is not surprising that many citizens are highly engaged on Twitter, 
we show that individual citizens are the most influential curators on Twitter in 
the polarized debate over MH17, in spreading both disinformation and counter-
disinformation among the most engaged users.
Even during international conflicts such as the one in Ukraine, where regime-
controlled media and information campaigns compete over particular narratives, a 
citizen profile is 4.3 times more likely to be retweeted than a commercial and state 
media profile. Of the top 50 most central accounts, 31 belong to either individual 
citizens or civil society groups. A proportion of the tweets posted by citizens 
contain links to external sources that propagate the Kremlin’s or western govern-
ments’ opposing portrayals of reality. By retweeting these narratives, ordinary 
citizens actively help produce, select and edit the vast stream of contradicting 
narratives. Importantly, this pattern is limited to the network core of users who are 
most engaged in the discussion of MH17. Established media maintain a dominant 
role at the periphery of the retweet network—among individuals who are more 
isolated and less engaged in the debate.
59 Stephan Lewandowsky, Ullrich K. H. Ecker and Colleen M. Seifert, ‘Misinformation and its correction: 
continued influence and successful debiasing’, Psychological Science in the Public Interest 13: 3, 2012, pp. 106–31; 
Andrew Guess, Brendan Nyhan and Jason Reifler, Selective exposure to misinformation: evidence from the consump-
tion of fake news during the 2016 US presidential campaign, 9 Jan. 2018, https://www.dartmouth.edu/~nyhan/fake-
news-2016.pdf.
60 Kelly R. Garrett, ‘Echo chambers online? Politically motivated selective exposure among internet news users’, 
Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 14: 2, 2009, pp. 265–85.
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If the concept of ‘information warfare’ is not fully adequate in the case of the 
MH17 crash and the conflict in Ukraine, we need to adopt new approaches. Any 
meaningful attempt to fight digital disinformation will need to engage citizens 
and civil society groups, not just by raising awareness, but by mobilizing them—
acknowledging that they are now curators of information. Moreover, to explore 
how truths about international conflicts are fought over in the digital age, it is not 
enough to analyse particular narratives. It is crucial to analyse the entire online 
conversation, using methods such as social network analysis. By turning our atten-
tion to not just what is said, but also to how information flows and who spreads it, 
we can begin to understand how digital disinformation—and attempts to counter 
it—succeed. Such understanding will ultimately allow us to identify the most 
influential agenda-setters.
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